the antitrust source

䡵 www.antitrustsource.com

1

䡵 O c t o b e r 2 0 11

Equity, Antitrust, and the Reemergence of the
Patent Unenforceability Remedy

J o rg e L . Co nt re r as

T

The conventional legal analysis of technical standard setting derives primarily from antitrust law.
But antitrust remedies, taken alone, may not be broad enough to address recent abuses of the
standardization process. The principal example of this shortcoming is the well-known case of

Rambus, Inc., which, over the course of several years, was alleged to have concealed relevant
patent applications from a standards organization in which it participated and then successfully

sued the entire DRAM industry for royalties after the standard was “locked-in.” Remarkably,

Rambus prevailed in its litigation campaign despite aggressive enforcement efforts by the Federal
Trade Commission.1 Rambus’s success stemmed, in part, from inherent limitations of the antitrust

theories asserted against it to reach its opportunistic behavior.
Another tool for redressing deceptive conduct in the context of standard setting is the equitable
remedy of patent unenforceability, the use of which was recently affirmed by the Federal Circuit
in Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.2 The Qualcomm decision marks an important advance in the
law surrounding standards-based patent hold-up by making available a remedy that is not constrained by the narrow requirements of antitrust law and which is effective toward both defendants
in private litigation and the broader community of standards implementers. Though not yet universally acknowledged as such, the remedy of patent unenforceability, when coupled with affirmative theories of liability, may offer the most effective tool available to address patent hold-up in
standard setting, both for private litigants and, potentially, for public enforcement agencies.

Standards Hold-Up Litigation
The narrative of patent “hold-up” in technical standard setting is well known: an opportunistic par䡵

ticipant in a standards-development organization (SDO), contrary to express rules or common
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expectations, conceals the fact that it holds a patent or patent application claiming one or more
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aspects of a standard under development. Then, after the standard has been approved and
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broadly adopted (“locked-in”), the patent holder emerges to seek royalties from implementers of
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the standard.3 Robert Merges and Jeffrey Kuhn colorfully refer to this pattern as “snake-in-theCollege of Law.
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grass.” 4 I will refer to it as “standards hold-up.” 5 By whatever name, many commentators agree
that such conduct is detrimental both to the standardization process and to the efficient operation
of the networked markets that depend upon it. Thus, before a standard is locked-in, the industry
may choose among various technical alternatives: some may be covered by patents and others
may not. Patented technology must compete with unpatented technology on the basis of factors
including price and technical quality. After lock-in, however, the cost of switching to a new standard increases dramatically, and patent holders who emerge without warning have significant,
and arguably improper, leverage to charge rents to implementers of the standard.
Standards hold-up cases have been litigated in two distinct but related modes: private litigation
and public enforcement. In the first mode (private litigation), a patent holder sues one or more
implementers of a standard for patent infringement and the defendant raises various defenses and
counterclaims seeking to render the asserted patents unenforceable against it. Cases in this
mode include Wang v. Mitsubishi,6 Stambler v. Diebold Inc.,7 Rambus v. Infineon,8 and Qualcomm
v. Broadcom. In the second mode (public enforcement litigation), an enforcement agency, typically
the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, initiates an independent action against the patent holder after
it has either sued or threatened implementers under the relevant patents. These cases include Dell
Computer Corp.,9 N-Data,10 and Rambus Inc. v. FTC,11 and have generally been brought on
antitrust grounds, whether under Section 2 of the Sherman Act or Section 5 of the FTC Act. In both
litigation modes, the patent holder’s ability to enforce the asserted patents is challenged on the
basis of its allegedly deceptive conduct toward the SDO and its other participants.

Equitable Defenses in Standards Hold-Up Litigation
Remedies in equity trace their origins to 14th century England, where ecclesiastical courts of
chancery arose as alternatives to the law courts.12 Due to their religious origins, the courts of
chancery purported to act on the basis of higher moral principles and dealt in flexible remedies,
such as injunctive relief and specific performance.13 As explained by the New York Court of
Appeals in the canonical case of Riggs v. Palmer, equitable principles ensure that “[n]o one shall
be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any
claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.” 14 And though the courts of
law and equity merged in the United States more than a century ago, equitable principles remain

4
5

Robert P. Merges & Jeffrey M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 C ALIF. L. R EV. 1, 10 (2009).
I consider standards hold-up to occur only when the patent holder is (or was) a member of or participant in the relevant SDO. In this respect
I part company with Merges and Kuhn (see discussion infra note 17).

6

Wang Labs. Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am. Inc., 860 F. Supp. 1448 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
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1988 WL 95479 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
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Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. Ag, 318 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

9

121 F.T.C. 616 (1996).
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Decision and Order, Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, FTC Docket No. C-4234 (Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/
os/caselist/0510094/080122do.pdf.
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alive and well. As observed by Henry Smith, equity today serves as a general “private law solution to opportunism.” 15
When a patent holder violates the express or implicit patent disclosure requirements of an SDO
and subsequently seeks to enforce patents against implementers of the adopted standard, the
infringing defendant may raise one or more equitable defenses. These defenses include fraud,
estoppel, laches, waiver, unclean hands, and implied license. For example, in Stambler v. Diebold
Inc., the patent holder Diebold was found to have known for ten years that a proposed standard
concerning the activation of automated teller machines infringed its patent, yet remained silent
“while an entire industry adopted the proposed standard.” 16 The court concluded that Diebold’s
silence was “intentionally misleading” and granted summary judgment for the defendant based
on the equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel.17 In Qualcomm v. Broadcom, the Federal
[E]quity today serves

Circuit held that Qualcomm’s deceptive conduct before an SDO supported the application of the
equitable defense of waiver, relieving the defendant Broadcom of any liability for infringement, and

as a general “private

also spoke favorably about the doctrine of equitable estoppel. And in Wang v. Mitsubishi, the

law solution to

er made assurances to an SDO regarding the absence of patents covering a standard.

opportunism.”

Agency Enforcement and the Failure of Antitrust Remedies to
Address Standards Hold-Up

Federal Circuit ruled in favor of the defendant on grounds of implied license after the patent hold-

Public actions to enforce the antitrust laws may be brought by the Department of Justice, the FTC,
and state attorneys general. Recently, the FTC has been the most active in seeking to curb
deceptive conduct and standards hold-up by means of antitrust enforcement. In Dell Computer,
the FTC alleged that Dell’s deception of the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) constituted unfair competition affecting commerce and thus violated Section 5 of the FTC Act. In the
resulting Consent Agreement, Dell was prohibited from enforcing the asserted patents against any
implementer of VESA’s VL-bus standard. The breadth of this remedy flows from the FTC’s broad
authority to redress market harm under Section 5.18
The Dell decision shaped the debate regarding standards hold-up for more than a decade and
may have emboldened the agency to exercise its Section 5 authority to police the standard-setting world more broadly. It did so most notably to redress the now-notorious conduct of Rambus
both during and after its participation in the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC).
As has been discussed at length in numerous books and articles, Rambus allegedly deceived
JEDEC participants regarding the patenting of standards on semiconductor DRAM technology.
When Rambus began to seek patent royalties from implementers of these standards, the FTC
brought an action charging Rambus with violation of Section 5(b) of the FTC Act and Section 2 of

15

Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 8, 17–18 (Working Paper, Oct. 22, 2010), available at http://extranet.isnie.
org/uploads/isnie2010/smith.pdf (defining “opportunism” as “behavior that is technically legal but done with a view to securing unintended benefits from the system, and these benefits are usually smaller than the costs they impose on others”).

16
17

1988 WL 95479 at 6.
Merges & Kuhn, supra note 4, have recently proposed that the equitable estoppel defense be broadened in the context of standards holdup to become a new defense that they term “standards estoppel.” While their proposal has significant merit, I disagree with the proposed
expansion of the estoppel defense to patents held by third parties who were not part of the standards-development process. Such a proposal would perversely enable SDOs to appropriate non-participant patented technology without the patent holder’s acquiescence and thus
unduly tilt the playing field in favor of standards adopters.

18

15 U.S.C. § 45.
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the Sherman Act. In 2006 the Commission ruled against Rambus under both theories of liability
and ordered, among other things, that Rambus license its patents to all implementers of the standards at specified royalty rates.19 In 2008, however, the D.C. Circuit reversed the Commission’s
ruling, holding that it failed to establish that Rambus’s deceptive conduct harmed competition for
purposes of the Sherman Act (i.e., that the relevant standards would not have been adopted but
for Rambus’s conduct). The court also cast doubt on the Commission’s Section 5 theory, questioning its generous reading of the vague JEDEC intellectual property policy and its conclusions
regarding common practices and expectations within the standard-setting community.
Though the validity of the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Rambus has been widely debated,20 a
number of commentators argue that antitrust law has proven to be a suboptimal theory for
addressing issues of standards hold-up.21 The weaknesses of antitrust law arise both when it is
[A]ntitrust law has

used as a theory of liability and also when it is used to fashion remedies (two distinct but inextricably related sides of the antitrust coin). Antitrust suffers as a theory of liability because, as the

proven to be a

D.C. Circuit reasoned, a showing of antitrust harm is necessarily tied to market-wide effects on
competition, rather than effects on individual competitors. Absent proof of market harm, antitrust

suboptimal theory for

injury cannot exist. Indeed, the dissent in Dell made this point in 1995, taking the view that the
allegations of the Commission’s complaint failed to demonstrate that Dell obtained market power

addressing issues of

as a result of its alleged misstatements to the SDO.

standards hold-up.

the FTC in Dell fashioned a sweeping order under Section 5 that prohibited Dell from enforcing its

Antitrust law also falls short in enabling appropriate remedies for standards hold-up. Thus, while
patents against any implementer of the VL-bus standard,22 the Commission’s order eleven years
later in Rambus exhibits a significant retreat from this early expansive posture. Perhaps influenced
by public commentary and the briefs of the parties or a more refined understanding and appreciation of the market harm arising from such conduct, the FTC in Rambus required that Rambus
license its patents to any implementer of the JEDEC standard but also permitted Rambus to collect a specified royalty with respect to this license (a royalty that was lower, of course, than

19

Opinion of the Commission on Remedy, Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302 (Feb. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Rambus Remedy Opinion], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/070205opinion.pdf; Final Order, Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302 (Feb. 2, 2007), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/070205finalorder.pdf.

20

See, e.g., Richard Dagen, Rambus, Innovation Efficiency and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 90 B.U. L. R EV. 1479 (2010); Joel M. Wallace,
Rambus v. F.T.C. in the Context of Standard-Setting Organizations, Antitrust, and the Patent Hold-Up Problem, 24 B ERKELEY T ECH . L.J. 661
(2009); Joshua D. Wright, Why the Supreme Court Was Correct to Deny Certiorari in FTC v. Rambus (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research
Paper No. 09-14, Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1349969; Richard Wolfram, “Analyze
This!” Deconstructing Rambus Following the Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari—The Mechanics of How the D.C. Circuit’s Decision
“Jumped the Tracks” (Am. Antitrust Inst. Commentary, Apr. 29, 2009), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/Rambus%20%20Analyze%20This%20-%20Deconstructing%20Rambus%20-%20AAI%20Commentary_042720092020.pdf.

21

See, e.g., Merges & Kuhn, supra note 4; Skitol & Vorrasi, supra note 1, at 31 (raising questions regarding the “viability of the Sherman Act
as a meaningful source of protection of open industry standards against patent hold-up”); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joshua D. Wright,
Federalism, Substantive Preemption, and Limits of Antitrust: An Application to Patent Holdup, 5 J. C OMPETITION L. & E CON . 469 (2009);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Patent Deception in Standard Setting: The Case for Antitrust Policy (U. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper July 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138002.
Interestingly, however, while the Rambus case was on appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the Third Circuit held that Qualcomm’s intentional deception of an SDO could give rise to a claim of monopolization under the Sherman Act. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314
(3d Cir. 2007). This decision is distinct from the Federal Circuit decision in Broadcom v. Qualcomm discussed infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.

22

As noted by the FTC in the Rambus Remedy Opinion, supra note 19, at 6, “The Commission enjoys wide latitude for judgment in fashioning a remedial order, subject to the constraint that the requirements of the order bear a reasonable relationship to the unlawful practices
that the Commission has found.”
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Rambus requested, but significant nonetheless). The rationale for this seeming generosity toward
a company that the Commission found to have engaged in a “deliberate course of deceptive conduct” 23 can be explained by the Commission’s need to fashion a remedy calculated to address
perceived market harm. Indeed, the Commission noted that imposing a requirement of royalty-free
licensing on Rambus would be justified only to the extent “necessary to restore the competitive
conditions that would have prevailed absent Rambus’s misconduct.” 24 Instead, the Commission
proceeded to construct an elaborate “reasonable royalty” analysis based on a series of assumptions about how the potential DRAM market would have looked “but for” Rambus’s deceptive conduct, and to set royalty rates for Rambus patents accordingly. While the FTC’s remedy opinion was
rendered moot by the D.C. Circuit’s reversal of its liability holding, the fact that the FTC’s analysis
would have resulted in the award of ongoing royalties to Rambus despite its deceptive conduct
suggests that antitrust remedies may not address all of the harms that are likely to arise in the context of standards hold-up and that perhaps other remedial regimes are more likely both to penalize those engaging in standards hold-up and to deter future instances of hold-up behavior.25

The Equitable Remedy of Unenforceability
An alternative to the antitrust theories advanced in Rambus is the equitable remedy of patent
unenforceability, which offers the flexibility to address both the market-based harms that antitrust
remedies seek to address, as well as a broader range of equitable harms. The unenforceability
remedy has historically been applied in cases in which a patentee has committed misconduct
before the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) or other substantial irregularities in prosecuting a
patent.26 The remedy renders a patent unenforceable not only toward a particular infringer but
toward the entire world,27 on the theory that the patent holder’s inequitable conduct taints the
property right ab initio.28 Accordingly, this drastic and far-reaching remedy has been called the
“atomic bomb” of patent law.29
In Broadcom v. Qualcomm, the district court for the first time applied the remedy of unenforceability to patents that Qualcomm failed to disclose to an SDO, analogizing such conduct, in
its effect and character, to misconduct before the PTO.30 The Federal Circuit approved of the dis-

23

Opinion of the Commission at 69, Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No. 9302 (Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9302/
060802commissionopinion.pdf.

24

Rambus Remedy Opinion, supra note 19, at 10.

25

An analogy can be drawn to the criminal law of theft, which punishes the thief in addition to providing restitution to the victim. Under the
antitrust theory applied to standards hold-up, the offender might be liable for restitution but not otherwise penalized for the wrong
committed.

26

See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Beckton, Dickinson & Co., 2011 WL 2028255, at *16 (Fed. Cir. May 25, 2011); Symbol Tech., Inc. v. Lemelson
Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“a patent may be rendered unenforceable if it was obtained after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution”); AGFA Corp. v. Creo Prods. Inc., 451 F.3d 1366, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (unenforceability due to inequitable
conduct before the PTO).

27

This globally applicable remedy should be distinguished from the more common in personam remedy of patent unenforceability, which is

28

See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys. Inc., 269 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and

utilized to redress, among other things, patent misuse. See U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC, 424 F.3d 1179, 1197–98 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

Antitrust: Reformation and Harm, 51 B.C. L. R EV. 905, 931 (2010) (“[t]he remedy of unenforceability, which the patent system itself administers against falsified applications, is designed to protect the integrity of the patent issuance process”).
29

Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). In addition, as noted by the
court in Therasense, “[a] finding of inequitable conduct may also spawn anti-trust and unfair competition claims.” 2011 WL 2028255, at
*22 (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965)).

30

Broadcom Inc. v. Qualcomm Corp., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1249 (S.D. Cal. 2007).
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trict court’s reasoning, recognizing its authority to “give a fair, just, and equitable response reflective of the offending conduct.” 31 And while the Federal Circuit narrowed the scope of the district
court’s remedy so as to render Qualcomm’s patents unenforceable only with respect to products
complying with the relevant standard, it retained the district court’s broad formulation that extended this remedy to all third parties, rather than limiting its effect to the defendant Broadcom. As a
result, the equitable remedy in Broadcom v. Qualcomm is just as far-reaching as the FTC’s remedy in Dell, but is used following the successful assertion of an equitable affirmative defense
(waiver), rather than an affirmative antitrust theory of liability.32

Implications for Agency Litigation
As demonstrated by Broadcom v. Qualcomm, the remedy of patent unenforceability may be
applied in private patent litigation following standards hold-up. This remedy may also be available
to federal enforcement agencies that wish to sanction hold-up behavior without limiting remedies
to redressing a specific antitrust injury. Armed with the equitable remedy of unenforceability, these
agencies may be empowered to address instances of actual and threatened standards hold-up
through the assertion of affirmative theories of liability, such as fraud and equitable estoppel.33
Standardization activity in the United States has typically been reviewed by the DOJ and the
FTC. The DOJ has a broad civil jurisdiction that extends to patent matters generally, whether or
not associated with antitrust claims.34 While the DOJ has historically addressed standardization
issues through its Antitrust Division, it would not be inappropriate for the Antitrust Division to cooperate with other units of the DOJ to seek remedies extending beyond traditional antitrust remedies,
such as patent unenforceability, to redress standards hold-up conduct.35
The scope of the FTC’s authority is prescribed by the FTC Act 36 as preventing the use of
“unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce.” 37 While in practice most applications of the FTC’s enforcement authority have sought to redress violations of the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws, the FTC’s authority is not limited to these claims. The Supreme Court has interpreted the FTC’s authority broadly
to encompass any “unfair competitive practice, even though the practice does not infringe either
the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws.” 38 The Court again recognized the FTC’s broad scope
of enforcement authority in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, in which it explained that the FTC
Act’s standard of “unfairness” encompasses not only violations of the Sherman Act and other

31
32

Qualcomm Corp. v. Broadcom Inc., 548 F.3d 1004, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Qualcomm argued that it was improper for the district court to impose a remedy of unenforceability in response to the successful assertion of an affirmative defense, and that the only appropriate remedy was a finding of noninfringement. The Federal Circuit disagreed and
affirmed the reasoning of the district court. Id. at 1025.

33

In this sense, estoppel may be asserted as an affirmative cause of action seeking to prevent ongoing or threatened hold-up, rather than
as an affirmative defense.

34
35

28 C.F.R. § 0.45(f) (2008) (covering “patent and allied cases and other patent matters [including] civil patent-fraud cases”).
Cf. United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232 (6th Cir. 1990) (Antitrust Division cooperated with other DOJ units in a case involving allegations of wire fraud).

36

15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq.

37

15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).

38

FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972).
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antitrust laws, but also “practices that . . . are against public policy for other reasons.” 39 Thus, while
the FTC has traditionally limited its analysis of standard-setting behavior to violations of the
Sherman Act, this limitation is not necessarily mandated by the scope of the Commission’s statutory authority.
The FTC has recently evidenced a willingness to address intellectual property issues beyond
. . . there is no reason

the strict boundaries of the Sherman Act in its 2003 report, To Promote Innovation: The Proper
Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy,40 and its 2011 report, The Evolving IP

to restrict the

Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice and Remedies with Competition.41 In this comprehensive
report, the Commission critiques several perceived weaknesses of current patent law that may

enforcement agencies

broadly impact markets and competition and recommends thirty-five specific changes to the law
governing both patent litigation and prosecution.42 A number of these recommendations and the

to the limited tools of

accompanying analysis are not based directly on antitrust law, but on general priciples of patent
law and its effect on markets.
Thus, while the federal enforcement agencies have traditionally relied on antitrust remedies to

antitrust law when

address perceived instances of standards abuse and hold-up, there is no reason to restrict the
alternative approaches,

enforcement agencies to the limited tools of antitrust law when alternative approaches, such as
the equitable remedy of patent unenforceability, may be better suited to addressing deception and

such as the equitable

harm in the standard-setting context.

remedy of patent

Conclusion
It has been widely suggested that opportunistic and deceptive behavior by participants in the

unenforceability, may

standard-setting process disrupts that process and introduces inefficiencies that are difficult to
cure using traditional antitrust remedies. Equity presents a powerful and flexible mechanism that

be better suited to

is designed to deter private party opportunism.43 As such, equity is an intuitively appealing theory with which to redress standards hold-up, the quintessence of opportunism. As a theory of lia-

addressing deception

bility, equity does not depend on the acquisition of market power or market effects to assign liability, as does antitrust law.44 And while antitrust remedies, as demonstrated by the FTC’s

and harm . . . .

short-lived remedial order in Rambus, seek to correct dislocations to the market that may have
been caused by deceptive conduct and the improper exercise of market power, equity seeks to
prevent the wrongdoer from profiting from his own wrongdoing.45 In this respect, the deterrent
value of equitable remedies is likely to be greater than that of market-based antitrust remedies.

39

476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986) (emphasis added). See H ERBERT H OVENKAMP, F EDERAL A NTITRUST P OLICY —T HE L AW

OF

C OMPETITION

AND I TS

P RACTICE 584–89 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing the debate over the scope of the FTC’s statutory authority); Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman
Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 A NTITRUST B ULL . 143, 211–15
(1993) (analyzing Sperry & Hutchinson and Indiana Federation of Dentists and questioning the Second Circuit’s seemingly inconsistent holding in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984)).
40

F ED . T RADE C OMM ’ N , T O P ROMOTE I NNOVATION : T HE P ROPER B ALANCE

OF

C OMPETITION

AND

PATENT L AW

AND

P OLICY (2003), available

at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
41

2011 FTC Report, supra note 3.

42

The broad scope of the Commission’s inquiry in the 2011 FTC Report has been questioned by some commentators. See, e.g., David M.
Maiorana & Geoffrey D. Oliver, Federal Trade Commission Issues Report on the Evolving Intellectual Property Marketplace, AIPLA
A NTITRUST N EWS , May 2011, at 2 (noting that, unlike prior FTC guidelines and reports, the 2011 FTC Report goes beyond the application
of antitrust laws to “issues of pure patent law”).

43

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

44

The appeal of equity as a theory of liability is discussed by Merges & Kuhn, supra note 4 and accompanying text.

45

See Head v. Porter, 70 F. 498, 501 (D.Mass. 1895) (“[I]t would be inequitable that he should make a profit out of his own wrong.”).
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One can only speculate whether the Rambus saga might have ended differently (and less favorably for Rambus) had a more liberal application of equitable remedies been applied. As to the
future, one hopes that the availability of the patent unenforceability remedy will strengthen deterrence of opportunistic and inefficient standards hold-up behavior. 䢇

